




This draft: January 14, 2020 
 
WHY IS THE EURO PUNCHING BELOW ITS WEIGHT? 
 
Ethan Ilzetzki* 
Carmen M. Reinhart 




On the twentieth anniversary of its inception, the euro has yet to expand its role as an international currency. 
We document this fact with a wide range of indicators including its role as an anchor or reference in 
exchange rate arrangements—which we argue is a portmanteau measure—and as a currency for the 
denomination of trade and assets. On all these dimensions, the euro comprises a far smaller share than that 
of the US dollar. Furthermore, that share has been roughly constant since 1999. By some measures, the euro 
plays no larger a role than the Deutschemark and French franc that it replaced. We explore the reasons for 
this underperformance. While the leading anchor currency may have a natural monopoly, a number of 
additional factors have limited the euro’s reach, including lack of financial center, limited geopolitical 
reach, and US and Chinese dominance in technology research. Most important, in our view, is the 
comparatively scarce supply of (safe) euro-denominated assets, which we document. The European Central 
Bank’ lack of policy clarity may have also played a role. We show that the euro era can be divided into a 
“Bundesbank-plus” period and a “Whatever it Takes” period. The first shows a smooth transition from the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism and continued to stabilize German inflation. The second period is 
characterised by an expanding ECB arsenal of credit facilities to European banks and sovereigns.   
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Although many arguments were advanced in support of the founding of the euro, surely one of the central 
goals was for Europe to have an international currency of the same stature as the dollar. In this paper, we 
document a broad range of measures of the euro’s status as an international currency. These markers 
include trade invoicing, international public and private bond issuance, central bank reserve portfolios, 
and other measures. Our central metric is based on the currency central banks strive to either fix their 
exchange rate to, or to use as a reference in a managed float. By most of these measures, the euro comes 
up as a distant second to the dollar. These metrics show that the advent of euro did little more than 
consolidate the pre-existing franc and DM zones, both largely regional in nature.1  
We explore some of the possible reasons for the euro’s stall. While the leading anchor currency 
arguably has a natural monopoly in peacetime, we contend that there are a number of structural factors 
that have limited the euro’s international reach. Central to these is the fragmented nature of Eurozone debt 
markets compared to the deep unified market for US Treasuries.2 The supply of truly safe euro-
denominated government debt is limited, a fact that became evident as sovereign risk escalated in the 
Eurozone periphery and markets for periphery debt became increasingly thin. Put simply, a significant 
portion of Eurozone sovereign debt, not least that of Italy, cannot be regarded on par with safe German or 
US debt. More generally, the fact that Eurozone capital markets do not appear to be as integrated as in the 
United States may also an obstacle.3 Our findings are consistent with a growing body of work 
documenting the dollar’s dominance in international trade and finance.4 Our focus is on the role of the 
euro as a runner up to the dollar. We document its relative weight as an anchor currency using a variety of 
indicators. The stall of the euro has been emphasized previously in Ilzetzki, Reinhart and Rogoff (2017, 
2019) and, more recently, by Maggiori, Neiman, and Schreger (2019, forthcoming); the latter particularly 
                                                     
1 Cohen and Subacchi (2008) referred to the new international monetary order as a “one-and-a-half currency system”. They too 
emphasize the continuity with the DM bloc. We quantify the relative weights of the dollar and the euro and show that the euro 
bloc has made limited progress in furthering its international role a decade later. 
2 Portes and Rey (1998) were early to suggest capital market deepening and integration as central determinants of the euro’s 
international role. 
3 Coeuré (2019) also makes the point that the scarcity of safe assets in the Euro-area limits its internationalization. See 
Cimadomo et al’s (2018) literature review on the comparison between US and Eurozone capital market integration. 
4 For broad reviews of the topic see Prasad (2015), Eichengreen (2011), and Eichengreen, Mehl, and Chiţu (2017). Dooley, 
Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003) were early to suggest that the dollar may have become the central anchor of the 21st century 
monetary system. Rey (2013) demonstrates the centrality of US monetary policy in international finance and Ilzetzki, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2019) document the dollar’s role as an anchor currency. The dollar’s dominance has been documented in trade 
invoicing (Goldberg and Tille, 2008, Gopinath 2015, Faudot and Ponsot 2016) and debt denomination (Bruno and Shin 2015 and 





highlight dollar dominance in international private bond markets. The ECB’s annual review of the 
international role of the euro has also documented the euro’s runner-up status as an international 
currency.5 The present paper aims to explore a broader range of evidence, but also to consider some 
possible reasons for the euro’s limited reach. We highlight the possibility of a natural monopoly for the 
dominant currency and that the Eurozone crisis may have stalled the euro’s emergence. But we further 
investigate deeper structural limitations to the euro’s reach including the scarcity of truly safe euro 
assets.6 
We also highlight that from its inception until mid-2012, the European Central Bank’s (ECB’s) policy 
may have put a excessive de-facto weight on German macroeconomic stability, and not enough on the 
rest.7 This excessive focus on German macroeconomic conditions may been a contributing factor to 
macroeconomic instability elsewhere, instability that ultimately resulted in crisis and paralysis. 
Specifically, we show that ECB policy came very close to mimicking a Taylor rule for Germany, a rule 
that at many times may have been counterproductive for the Eurozone as a whole. Post mid-2012, the 
ECB looks to be following something much closer to euro-wide Taylor rule, but only by treading into de 
facto fiscal policy and straining the limits of its mandate, a policy that may not be sustainable if another 
large economic shock were to hit or political consensus were to fray in the face of populist pressures. To 
be clear, lack of ECB policy coherence may have had damaging impacts on the Eurozone economy, but 
played only a secondary role in the Euro’s limited reach as an anchor currency.  
We conclude by asking where the euro stands now in relation to ever-rising dollar dominance, and 
what it might take to overcome the challenges the euro has faced in its first 20 years. One further reason 
for the dollar’s continued dominance has been the dramatic rise of dollar-anchored Asian economies’ 
share in global economic activity.8 Looking forward, whether the euro remains a regional currency or 
expands its international reach may well be determined in Asia. The euro’s international role could 
expand substantially if China—perhaps in response to a sustained trade war—gave the euro a larger 
                                                     
5 European Central Bank (2019) emphasizes the recovery of the euro as an international currency following the crisis. We discuss 
the crisis in Section III.B below. The ECB stresses that internationalizing the euro isn’t part of its official mandate. However, the 
European Commission has stated the internationalization of the euro as an objective, most recently in a December 2018 
communique leading to the European Commission (2019) report. 
6 We do not consider the normative question of whether Eurozone members or the world economy would benefit from a 
multipolar monetary system.   
7 Feldstein (1997) predicted that converging macroeconomic objectives would lead to conflict among Eurozone members and 
may hamper the monetary union project. He particularly noted the divergence between Germany’s and other member countries’ 
opinion on monetary policy as a potential source of instability. 
8 That these economies maintained their dollar anchors for two decades despite substantial trade with Europe is in itself be an 





weight in its currency basket on a sustained basis, and particularly if many other Asian countries followed 
suit. However, we caution that even if China were to permanently retain a much higher weight on the euro 
in its basket, the boost to the euro’s international status would likely be short-lived. The emergence of the 
renminbi as an anchor currency could quickly usurp the euro’s runner-up status in the international 
monetary system. 
II. The International Role of the Euro 
 
This section documents the international role of the euro at its twentieth anniversary along a number of 
dimensions. A natural point of departure is the anchor currency classification of Ilzetzki, Reinhart and 
Rogoff (henceforth IRR, 2019). The IRR dataset assigns an “anchor” or “reference currency” to each 
country and territory in the world at a monthly frequency from 1945 to 2016. As we argue in IRR (2019), 
we view our anchor/reference classification as an encompassing portmanteau measure of the diverse 
forms of anchor currency dominance including invoice pricing, reserves, debt denomination, etc. Thus, in 
principle, the currency to which a central bank anchors its exchange rate summarizes the revealed 
preference of policymakers’ aggregated across all these considerations. After documenting the euro’s 
stalled rise as an anchor currency, we turn to specific aspects of the role of an international currency and 
document the euro’s standing on each dimension.9   
II.A The Euro as an Anchor Currency 
The IRR classification is based on a set of algorithms that jointly classify a country’s exchange rate 
arrangement (in terms of its flexibility) and anchor or reference currency. Details can be found in IRR 
(2019).10 IRR document how the 21st century has seen a rise of managed floating (particularly the many 
                                                     
9 To be clear, we do not imply a causal chain beginning with anchor currency choice and leading to private sector decisions. The 
various dimensions of an international currency likely reinforce each other. 
10 In IRR (2019), the exchange rate of 196 countries and territories is evaluated against eleven candidate anchor currencies: The 
candidate anchors are the US dollar, the Deutschmark, and French franc (replaced by the euro following 1999), the Japanese yen, 
the British pound, the Russian ruble, the Swiss franc, the Australian dollar, the South African rand, and the Brazilian real. The 
candidate anchors were chosen based on historical practice and currencies that are widely included in exchange rate baskets. In 
addition, currencies that are classified as freely floating themselves become candidate anchors in the relevant years: This adds the 
Canadian dollar and the Turkish lira in some years. The Chinese renminbi is not considered a candidate anchor currency as it has 
been strongly linked to the dollar itself and is not fully internationally convertible. Hence anchoring to the dollar and the 
renminbi is observationally equivalent. We therefore note the possibility that this classification may currently overstate the role of 
the dollar and warn the reader from simple extrapolations into the future. The algorithm also allows for de facto currency baskets 
as potential anchors. Baskets include a dollar-euro, dollar-yen, euro-yen, and dollar-euro-yen basket, with equal weights on the 





flavors of inflation-targeting) regimes, especially in emerging markets. Although such currencies cannot 
be said to be within a fixed band relative to any  anchor currency (or basket of anchor currencies), our 
classification algorithm nevertheless reveals that many can still be regarded as  managed floating, with 
central banks explicitly (or implicitly) still placing a significant weight on exchange rate stabilization. To 
make this distinction, we refer to the dollar (or other anchor) as a “reference” currency rather than an 
“anchor” currency in these cases.11 Appendix I gives a brief overview of the IRR classification algorithm. 
Further detail can be found in IRR (2019). 
To what extent has the euro’s role as anchor currency appreciably changed in the first two decades of 
its existence? The answer can be seen in Figure I, which shows the share of countries anchored to the euro 
since its inception in 1999. These data are spliced together with the share of countries previously 
anchored to the German DM or the French franc from 1975 to 1998. For comparison purposes, the figure 
also shows the share of countries anchored to the US dollar from 1975 to 2016. The top panel presents the 
share of countries anchored to the euro or dollar weighted by these countries’ share of world GDP. This is 
the more relevant measure when thinking of the international reach of the euro. The lower panel shows 
the (unweighted) share of countries.12  
The figure shows that to date the euro hasn’t made inroads as a global anchor currency. In fact, the 
GDP-weighted measure suggests that the importance of the euro has declined in this period, with nearly 
25 percent of world GDP anchored to the euro at its inception, compared to only 15 percent today. In 
large part, of course, this reflects a decade of poor growth post crisis that reduced the size of Europe’s 
footprint on the world economy, especially relative to the faster growth of emerging markets. The thin 
line at the bottom of the figure shows the share of world GDP anchored to the euro, excluding the 
Eurozone itself. This line is perhaps the more relevant one in considering the euro’s international role. It 
shows that the growth of dollar-anchored emerging markets is only part of the story. By this metric, the 
                                                     
Anchors are determined on the basis of 1, 2, and 5 percent exchange rate bands. Each country is assigned an anchor as that which 
the country’s currency can be said to be within the narrowest band among the eleven anchors considered. Data is available at 
https://www.ilzetzki.com/irr-data and full chronologies of anchor currencies since 1945 can be found in Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and 
Rogoff (2017). 
11 The reference currency is assigned using additional criteria for managed floats. These include the currency composition of 
foreign trade invoicing, external debt denominated, and central bank foreign reserves, in addition to the central bank’s historical 
practices. As noted in IRR (2019), the criteria point in the same direction in all cases so that a reference currency can be 
unambiguously assigned to all managed floating currencies. Finally, freely floating currencies are assigned to be anchored to 
themselves. 
12 Other exchange rate regimes classifications include Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), Shambaugh (2004), Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger, (2005, 2016) and Klein and Shambaugh (2010). They all implicitly classify anchor currency as well and would 
likely show similar patterns. Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) classify on the basis of reserve accumulation. We document 
the dollar’s dominance on this dimension in the following section. The other classifications are similar in spirit to our own and 





euro’s role as an anchor currency is truly limited, with countries representing only 3.5 percent of non-
Eurozone world GDP anchored to the euro. The biggest loss to the euro bloc in this period was the UK, 
which transitioned from a euro anchor to a freely floating regime. This loss is unlikely to be recovered in 
the foreseeable future, with the UK now in the process of exiting the European Union (EU). We note that 
the stall in the euro’s significance would be virtually as large even if one ended the base period in the 
mid-1980s, long before the euro’s conception. 
The bottom panel of Figure I, which reflects the international popularity of the euro (irrespective of 
country size) also reveals stagnation after some modest gains in the early years of the new currency. In 
this panel, the share of countries unweighted by GDP has slightly risen from 26 to 28 percent. However, 
in a longer historical perspective, this increase is moderate relative to the gains of the DM-franc bloc post-
Bretton Woods. This bloc grew from 17 percent in 1975 to 26 percent on the eve of euro adoption. We 
note that much of the increase in the share of countries anchored to the euro over this period consisted of 
new European Union members in Central and Eastern Europe, who are required to join the euro sooner or 
later according to EU rules. 
The fate of the dollar in this period provides an interesting counterpoint. The top panel of Figure I 
illustrates that the US bloc has steadily and dramatically increased in its reach from the mid ‘80s (with 45 
percent of world GDP anchored to the dollar) to today (nearly 70 percent). This is despite the similar 
decline of the US economy as a share of world GDP, even if recent performance has been better in the US 
than in the Eurozone (see Figure A.1 in the appendix). Even when excluding the US itself from the count, 
more than half of world GDP anchored to the dollar, compared to one third at the advent of the euro. This 
largely driven by the growth of dollar-anchored emerging markets, most prominently China. Further, the 
bottom panel of Figure I shows that more countries (in unweighted terms) joined the dollar bloc than did 
the euro bloc since 1999.13  
Figure II presents the evolution of these two blocs in two maps. The top map compares euro bloc in 
2016 to the bloc in 1999. Countries in darker shades have anchored to the euro since its advent. Countries 
in lighter shades were anchored to the euro at its inception, but have since left the bloc. The reach of the 
euro is largely confined to the euro area itself, to non-euro EU members, and to former French colonies in 
                                                     
13 Two factors account for most of the increase in dollar anchoring in the 1990s seen in Figure I. First, countries formerly in the 
Soviet bloc (with either multiple exchange rate markets or anchored to the Russian ruble) anchored to the dollar after the fall of 
the iron curtain. This included some current EU and Eurozone members (Poland, Baltic countries) who have since adopted a euro 
anchor (or the euro itself). These cases drive the increases in euro anchoring between 1995 and 2000 seen in the bottom panel of 
Figure I. Second, hyperinflationary currencies (most prominently in Latin America) who were unanchored in the 1970s and 





Africa, most notably the members of the West-African CFR franc zone. Currencies that have anchored to 
the euro since 1999 are also largely confined to EU accession countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
This period has also seen the (relatively larger) economies of the UK and Turkey de-anchor themselves 
from the euro. 
The contrast with the dollar bloc, shown in the bottom map, is striking. The dollar’s reach is truly 
global, with currencies in all world regions anchored to the dollar. A number of economies have 
decoupled their currencies from their link to the US dollar, most notably Canada and South Africa, in 
favor of freely floating regimes. A number of other economies (Brazil, Turkey) briefly flirted with freely 
floating regimes in the early 2000s, only to re-anchor to the dollar as the global financial crisis unfolded. 
But numerous countries ranging from Europe to Africa to Asia have moved to a dollar anchor in this 
period. In comparison to the dollar’s global reach, the euro remains a regional currency.14 
Two caveats are due. First, while the dollar bloc has expanded more rapidly in the past two decades 
than the (arguably shrinking) euro bloc, currencies in the euro bloc are more closely anchored to the euro 
than those in the dollar bloc are to the dollar, on average. The nineteen ECB member countries have 
abandoned national currencies altogether in favor of the euro, the CFA franc is pegged to the euro, and a 
number of Eastern European countries have crawling pegs to the euro. In comparison, several large 
members of the dollar bloc have managed floating currencies (e.g. Brazil, Turkey) or have wide bands 
around the dollar (e.g. India).15 
Second, the Chinese role in the international monetary system is evolving steadily, in particular 
moving to a more fluid peg the last couple years, with the euro apparently receiving a larger weight. Of 
course, the Chinese government has long-term ambitions to make the renminbi itself an anchor currency 
(see Prasad, 2016). A more independent renminbi would be a substantial loss to the dollar bloc and would 
increase the international standing of the euro relative to the dollar, but less so in absolute terms. In fact, a 
freely floating renminbi could easily usurp the euro’s role as the second major anchor currency nearly 
overnight.16   
                                                     
14 Of course, the gap between the euro and other candidate anchors is also substantial. For example, no country currently anchors 
its currency to the British pound or the Japanese yen. The wildcard remains the renminbi, as we discuss below.  
15 Figure A.2 in the appendix shows an index that re-weighs countries anchored to the dollar and euro based on their exchange 
rate flexibility, putting a substantially higher weight on those countries that have a harder peg (details in the figure’s footnote). 
Even by this index, the dollar is nearly twice as important as the euro as an anchor currency.   
16 China’s share of world GDP stands at 16 percent, already exceeding the share of world GDP anchored to the euro, standing at 
15 percent, as shown in Figure I. This share would increase further if other countries, particularly in East-Asia, moved to a 





For the moment, with the renminbi widely unconvertible, a fully international role for the renminbi 
appears distant, despite China’s rapidly growing role as an international lender. In the nearer future, China 
nevertheless remains a wildcard, as its anchor to the dollar is itself evolving. In late 2015, the People’s 
Bank of China announced that it is replacing its US dollar band with a narrow band around a basket of 
currencies, including a greater weight to the euro. It is too soon to tell how this policy will play out in 
practice, but we note here that should such a policy come to fruition, the world’s second largest economy 
may transfer some of the weight of its anchor toward the euro. Applying our algorithm to the brief period 
since this transition suggests that the China may have transitioned to a roughly equally weighted dollar-
euro basket. We note that the timeframe is too short to evaluate an exchange rate regime, particularly 
given that this has been a period of relative stability in the dollar-euro exchange rate. However, should 
this transition prove durable, it would increase the share of world GDP anchored to the euro from 15 to 23 
percent and decrease the share anchored to the US dollar from 69 to 61 percent if Chinese GDP is 
allocated equally to the dollar and euro anchors. Should other countries in the Asian supply chain follow 
suit, China’s change to a more diversified exchange rate basket would have an even larger effect.17 (As 
noted earlier, a number of other major central banks currently in the dollar bloc have also shown 
increased flexibility, although they have shown no sign of viewing the euro as an alternative.)  
II.B Markers of an Anchor Currency 
Having documented the limited reach of the euro as an anchor currency, we now turn to narrower, but 
more specific markers, of an international currency and document how the euro fares on each dimension. 
Anchoring to a currency often requires central banks to hold a large stock of foreign exchange reserves, 
particularly in an era of increasing capital account openness. Figure III shows the share of world central 
bank reserves held in dollars and euros from 1995 to 2018 (or European Exchange Rate Mechanism, 
EERM, currencies prior to 1999).18 The shares have held steady with roughly 20 percent of central bank 
reserves held in euro-denominated assets, compared to roughly 60 percent in dollars. The figure shows 
that the euro’s share of central bank reserves is no higher than that of EERM currencies in 1995.19 20  
                                                     
17 At such a point, however, one would need to consider whether these currencies constitute a separate renminbi bloc, as 
discussed in footnote 13 above.   
18 Data are from the IMF’s Currency Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves database, which gives the currency composition 
of official foreign exchange reserves for reporting countries. In 2018, these comprised 93 percent of all reserves.  
19 “Euro” reserves prior to 1999 are given by reserves denominated in Deutschemark, French franc, Dutch guilder and ERM, so 
they slightly understate the share of European currencies in international reserves prior to 1999.  
20 One shouldn’t make too much of the higher frequency fluctuations in dollar and euro shares. Figure A.3 in the appendix zooms 
in on the euro share of central bank reserves alongside the dollar-euro exchange rate. The high-frequency changes in the euro 





Admittedly, this stable share of central bank reserves should be viewed in the context of an 
unprecedented surge in reserve holdings, particularly from emerging markets. The dark line in Figure III 
shows that global central bank reserves have increased more than eight-fold from $1.2 trillion in 1999 to 
nearly $11 trillion today (both values in US dollars). This means that the quantity of euro-denominated 
assets held as central bank reserves has also increased by roughly the same proportion and currently 
stands at €2 trillion. The demand for central bank reserves in general has led to a dramatic increase in 
demand for euro-denominated assets. These facts are consistent with central banks attempting to maintain 
a roughly constant euro exposure in their portfolios, but they show no signs of tilting towards the euro 
over time. In contrast, the share of central bank reserves held in currencies other than dollars or euros is 
steadily increasing and has nearly doubled (from 10 to 17 percent) since the global financial crisis.  
Official foreign exchange holdings may provide a skewed view of the relative importance of the euro 
if governments put an undue weight on the dollar in their policy considerations. It is therefore useful to 
consider measures emanating from the private sector as well. Figure IV looks at the foreign exchange 
turnover for four major currencies from 1995 to 2016.21 This measure comes from the Bank for 
International Settlement’s survey of over one thousand of the largest currency dealers worldwide and 
gives a sense of the total demand for transactions in and liquidity of major currencies. This indicator gives 
the share of foreign exchange transactions in which the stated currency is on one side of the transaction. 
The total share of transactions therefore sums up to 200 percent, but the maximum possible share for any 
given currency is 100 percent.  
The figure shows a strikingly similar pattern to that arising from official holdings. Close to 90 percent 
of transactions involved trades of US dollars for another currency, highlighting the centrality of the dollar 
as an international medium of exchange. The euro’s share of foreign exchange turnover has held roughly 
constant throughout the period at around 35 percent and peaked just below 40 percent in 2010. By this 
measure the currency balance of the international monetary system has remained very stable during the 
euro’s first two decades with no sign that this anchor currency has gained market share. The euro’s share 
is slightly smaller than the combined share of the UK pound and the Japanese yen. Japanese and UK GDP 
combine to two thirds of that of the Eurozone and these two economies have an even smaller relative 
share of global international trade. The turnover statistics suggest that the euro is punching below its 
weight—and not only in comparison to the dominant US dollar.  
                                                     
21 The euro is replaced by the Deutschemark prior to 1999. On one hand this understates the share of pre-1999 Eurozone 
transactions, because it excludes all Eurozone economies other than Germany. On the other hand it overstates this share because 





The global financial crisis highlighted the significant role of the US dollar not only in the global, but 
also in the European financial system. The scale of Federal Reserve’s swap lines with the ECB and 
private European financial institutions was, of course, part of the policy response to meet this demand for 
dollars.22 Figure A.4 in the appendix (adapted from Bahaj and Reis, 2019) illustrates the magnitude of the 
Fed’s global dollar denominated liquidity provision during the crisis. While the crisis period was perhaps 
an unusual period, if anything the narrow focus on swap lines understates the global demand for dollar 
liquidity that the Fed supplies. Figure V shows the total dollar-denominated liabilities of the Federal 
Reserve to non-US residents from 2000 to early 2019. The Fed provides over $5 trillion in direct liquidity 
to the rest of the world, a figure that has more than trebled since the beginning of the 21st century. A third 
of this liquidity is held in the EU illustrating the massive demand for dollar funding there. Half of this 
latter sum is held in the UK; the dotted line in the figure shows the Fed’s liquidity provision to residents 
of the EU excluding the UK.23 The figure also shows euro-denominated liabilities of the ECB to non-
Eurozone residents. While these liabilities have increased 40-fold since the advent of the euro, ECB-
supplied international liquidity is an order of magnitude smaller than that of the Fed. The figure illustrates 
that demand for Fed liquidity in Europe alone exceeds the demand for ECB liquidity elsewhere. In fact, 
the figure somewhat overstates the demand for ECB-issued liquidity overseas as almost the entirety of the 
large increases in euro denominated liabilities in 2008 and 2012 were held by the Federal Reserve as part 
of swap arrangements between these two central banks. The more recent rise in ECB overseas liabilities 
since 2016, including swap lines with People’s Bank of China, could be a real phenomenon worth 
following in years to come. 
Figure VI shows that demand for dollar-denominated assets is not restricted to the safe assets created 
by the Fed. It shows the composition of developing countries’ public (and publicly guaranteed: PPG) 
foreign currency debt denominated in euros (or DM and French francs prior to 1999) and dollars from 
1975 to 2017. This metric also shows a very stable international role for the euro with the share of 
developing country sovereign debt denominated in euros hovering around 10 percent. The euro has not 
become a currency of choice for external debt denomination with only 8 percent of PPG debt 
denominated in euros in 2017, exactly the share the euro held in 2000. If one goes back to the decade 
prior to euro adoption, we see that in fact the euro plays a smaller role today than did the German and 
                                                     
22 See Bahaj and Reis (2019) for a detailed analysis of the role of central bank swap lines during the crisis and beyond. 





French currencies it replaced, with the latter two holding a 13 percent share in 1990 and a similar share at 
the end of the Bretton Woods period. In comparison, the share of public debt denominated in US dollars 
in the developing world has increased dramatically. The dollar’s share has steadily increased from 45 
percent in the early 1990s to 75 percent today.24 In fact, these data likely understate the increase in dollar 
dominance over this period because the World Bank data do not fully incorporate China’s official lending 
to dozens of countries in the last decade, the lion’s share of which is denominated in dollars, not renminbi 
(see Horn, Reinhart, and Trebesch 2019).  Again should China re-calibrate its exchange rate policy—for 
example as an economic and political response to trade wars—this situation could change. 
In an important recent paper, Maggiori, Neiman and Schreger (forthcoming) find a huge chasm 
between the dollar and euro when it comes to privately issued debt. In fact, in most regions of the world, 
when private borrowers want to sell bonds abroad, they end up denominating debt either in the lender’s 
currency or in the US dollar. Europe, even Germany, is no exception. This constraint is particularly 
important when it comes to small and medium size businesses, who generally have very little 
international capital market access, in part due to fixed costs to entering the market. US small and 
medium size firms stand as a striking exception, a factor that Maggiori, Neiman and Schreger conjecture 
may quantitatively be even more important for growth than the traditional “exorbitant privilege” that the 
US government has in borrowing abroad. 
Table I summarizes these and other measures and compares the roles of the US dollar and the euro as 
international currencies as the latter comes to its twentieth anniversary. The US economy is 50 percent 
larger than the Eurozone economy but the dollar dominates by a larger margin on nearly all dimensions. 
Twice as many countries have anchored their currencies to the US dollar as compared to the euro. The 
share of world GDP represented by the euro-anchored economies is even smaller. Developing countries 
prefer denominating their external debt in dollars relative to the euro by a factor of nearly ten to one. 
Almost all foreign exchange transactions have the dollar on one side of the exchange. The European 
banking system has been showing increased home bias over time, but European banks still hold only 71 
percent of their assets and denominate 59 of their liabilities in euros. This compares to 85 and 76 percent 
in the US, respectively.  
The table includes an additional indicator for which a snapshot is available in 2015: the currency of 
choice for trade invoicing. We report here a “trade invoicing index”, which we have constructed using the 
                                                     






data of Gopinath (2015). It averages the percent of countries invoicing any trade in euros (or dollars) with 
the share of trade invoiced in this currency. The euro fares far better on this indicator than on any other 
anchor currency metric with an index of 56 compared to 69 for the US. However, these numbers need to 
be taken in context of EU dominance in international trade. One quarter of the world’s exports originates 
in the Eurozone, compared to only 9 percent from the US (the figure for China is 12 percent). The gap is 
only slightly smaller for imports. One might have expected a larger role for the euro given that the EU is 
the largest global hub for international trade in goods and services by a large margin. 25 26  
In summary, our data on anchor currencies suggest that the euro lags by a substantial margin relative 
to the dollar as an anchor currency. This margin existed at the advent of the euro and has held stable over 
the two decades of the euro’s existence. Specific roles of an international currency—trade and debt 
denomination and foreign exchange reserves—all show similar patterns. This is to be expected. The 
various roles of an anchor currency are complements and dominance of an anchor in each dimension is 
likely to reinforce its dominance in the others. The following section discusses these complementary roles 
as one explanation for the still fledging role of the euro as an anchor.   
III. Why is the Euro Punching below Its Weight? 
 
Why has the euro still remained a largely regional currency for Europe, its periphery, and some of its 
former African colonies? The simplest answer is that there is only room for one major anchor currency 
and that the dollar already plays this role. There are a number of mutually-reinforcing factors that would 
lead to a natural monopoly for a single global medium of exchange, store of value, and unit of account. 
Swoboda (1969) pointed to the convenience yield of invoicing trade in a common currency. Global oil 
and other primary commodity markets are based on the US dollar. The rise of global supply chains will 
have reinforced the strategic complementarities in firms’ invoicing decisions (Bacchetta and Wincoop, 
2005; Goldberg and Tille, 2008). Similar complementarities exist in the currency denomination of assets 
(Hassan, Mertens, and Zhang, 2016; He, Krishnamurthy,and Milbradt. 2019). Finally, currency 
                                                     
25 Both the trade figure and Gopinath data include intra-Eurozone trade. A rough estimate of the Eurozone’s exports to the rest of 
the world is still close to a fifth of total world trade. The euros’s trade invoicing index would be smaller, and the dollar’s higher, 
if adjusted to exclude intra-Eurozone trade. If all intra-Eurozone trade is invoiced in euros, the dollar index would come to 
roughly 75 and the euro index would decline to below 50 under this adjustment.  
26 The dollar is also an important currency for intra-national trade in dollarized economies. On de facto dollarization see Calvo 





denomination in goods and financial assets may also be complementary, as suggested in recent work by 
Gopinath and Stein (2018).    
History would appear to support these theories. The British pound played a similarly outsized role in 
the 19th and early 20th century. There is perhaps an analogy to the relatively limited reach of the Latin 
Monetary Union, with France in its center, to that of the euro today. History also suggests persistence in 
the global anchor currency of choice. The UK pound dominated well after the US economy surpassed it in 
size. Earlier, Spanish silver dollar persisted as a global currency long after Spain’s empire declined. That 
the US dollar rose in global status only in the aftermath of World War I and the unravelling of the British 
Empire suggests that large seismic shifts may be necessary for the main anchor currency to fall from 
grace.27 
The natural monopoly in anchor currencies is not a universally held view. Eichengreen (2011) predicts 
a not-so-distant future where the dollar, euro, and the renminbi share the stage in a tripartite international 
monetary oligopoly.28 29 Our evidence from the previous section shows that the euro has shown no sign of 
emerging to more than a secondary role in the monetary order of the 21st century to date. This section 
points to a number of factors that may have inhibited the euro’s rise. These factors are also ones to look at 
in considering its potential to increase its international position in the future. 
While denomination of goods and assets are complements, much of the discussion that follows 
focusses on financial rather than goods markets. The reason for this was highlighted in Table I. The euro 
is already a major invoicing currency, almost at par with the dollar. Further, the Eurozone is not punching 
below its weight in volume of trade, being both the source and destination of more than a quarter of world 
trade. It is particularly in the financial arena that dollar dominance looms large. 
We begin our discussion with the availability of safe assets, which we view as central to the euro’s 
limited international reach. Next, we reflect on some other structural weaknesses that may challenge the 
euro’s international status in the foreseeable future. We then turn to the Eurozone crisis. While the crisis 
may have stalled the euro’s emergence as an international currency, it also exposed its structural 
deficiencies, so that the crisis may have been as much a result as a cause of the euro’s weaknesses. In the 
                                                     
27 Eichengreen, Mehl, and Chiţu (2017) have a different interpretation of the historical record where there were important periods 
where several international currencies shared the stage. 
28 As we note in the concluding section, the sheer size of East-Asian economies implies that the euro would likely be a distant 
third in such a tripartite system. China’s (growing) share of world GDP alone exceeds the total share of world GDP currently 
anchored to the euro. 





following section, we turn to ECB policy, which may have been an additional hindrance to the euro’s 
expansion. 
III.A Asset Availability 
 We begin our discussion with a search for high-quality euro denominated assets. The core supply of 
euro-denominated assets will necessarily originate in Europe and central to these are high-grade sovereign 
bonds. The large and increasing demand for safe assets has been widely studied (see Caballero, Farhi, and 
Gourinchas 2017).30 Whether they are accumulated as a safe asset or for exchange rate stabilization (IRR, 
2019), central bank reserves are largely held in bonds of a relatively select number of issuers. We 
documented in Figure III that the lion’s share of these reserve holdings are held in US dollar denominated 
assets. The ratio of dollar to euro assets in central bank reserves is three, while US GDP is only 50% 
larger than the Eurozone. This reflects a substantial dollar bias in safe asset holdings. The left-hand panel 
of Figure VII puts this demand in the context of the supply of euro and dollar safe assets. The figure 
shows that the supply of marketable US government debt, at over $14 trillion in 2018, dwarfs the 
combined availability of German and French marketable government debt, at just over $3 trillion. Even if 
one includes the debt of other non-crisis Eurozone economies, the marketable debt of Eurozone 
sovereigns amounts to only $4 trillion.31 In the context of $10 trillion central bank foreign exchange 
reserves, safe euro denominated assets are in short supply. 
 This is not to say that European sovereigns are insufficiently indebted. Quite to the contrary, only four 
euro-area governments currently meet the Maastricht criterion of a debt to GDP ratio under 60 percent. 
France’s debt to GDP ratio is inching towards 100 percent, and Italy’s debt well exceeds the size of its 
economy. Instead, it is the absence of a Eurozone-wide safe asset that doesn’t allow the area to mobilize 
its combined fiscal capacity. With volatile spreads throughout the crisis, the debts of Italy, Spain, 
Portugal, and Greece can hardly be said to be safe and have not been widely included in reserve portfolios 
outside the Eurozone. The illiquidity of these debt markets becomes particularly manifest in times of 
economic or political turmoil. (More on this in Section III.C below.) 
 The foreign demand for US debt can hardly be taken for granted. As Figure VIII shows, the share of 
US marketable debt held overseas has gradually declined since 2008. Central bank reserve holdings of US 
                                                     
30 Chahrour and Valchev (2018) provide a theory that links the availability of safe assets to anchor currency choice.  





bonds has even been declining in absolute terms since 2015. But as the figure illustrates, this hasn’t 
reflected a transition to euro-based assets, whose share of foreign ownership has similarly declined.32  
 US dominance as a supplier of corporate bonds is even more striking. As the right-hand panel of 
Figure VII shows, the total stock of US non-financial corporate debt securities outstanding is almost five 
times as large (at 39 percent of US GDP) as the stock of Eurozone corporate issues (at 11 percent of 
GDP). A foreign investor seeking a diversified international corporate bond portfolio will by necessity 
bias her holdings to dollar-denominated assets. The vast gap is significantly explained by the reliance on 
bank, rather than bond financing in the Eurozone, with the stock of outstanding corporate bank loans 
twice as large as in the US. Close to 80 percent of Eurozone corporate debt is held as unmarketable assets 
on bank balance sheets (compared to less than 30 percent in the US), making them unavailable as assets 
for foreign holders. If anything, this figure likely overstates the supply of marketable euro denominated 
debt. As Maggiori, Neiman and Schreger (forthcoming) show, US corporate debt is universally 
denominated in dollars, but issuance in foreign currency is more common elsewhere.33  
 Turning from bonds to stocks, Table II shows the market capitalization of major equity markets. The 
US dominates in this category as well with the total valuation of stocks on the New York Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ each double the market capitalization of the largest ex-US competitor (the Japan Exchange 
Group).34 US equity markets exceed the combined market capitalization of equity markets in all other 
regions considered here (Eurozone, China, UK, and Japan) and comprise nearly half of the world’s equity 
market capitalization. This too is yet another huge factor pointing to dollar dominance.  Even though the 
US accounts for only 20% of GDP, it has a far superior capacity for securitizing assets given its relatively 
reliable legal and regulatory system. 
 Although a number of national exchanges united under the Euronext umbrella, Eurozone equity 
markets remain very fragmented, with Euronext only halfway between the London Stock Exchange and 
the Japan Exchange Group in total market capitalization. Combining all Eurozone exchanges from the 
Euronext down to the Malta Stock Exchange gives a total market capitalization that is still five times 
smaller than the two US stock exchanges. Trade volumes are even smaller in comparison, with monthly 
equity turnover in US markets more than seven times that of European markets, reflecting higher liquidity 
                                                     
32 A substantial portion of these declines are due to an increase in Federal Reserve and ECB holdings of these assets. 
33 20% of Eurozone corporate bonds are denominated in foreign currency. There is also a growing share of US corporations 
issuing euro-denominated bonds (so called “reverse yankee” bonds), but this is a smaller phenomenon at around 2% of 
outstanding US marketable corporate debt. 





of US-issued stocks. While Chinese stock markets are still somewhat opaque and closed to foreign 
investors, and while market capitalizations obviously fluctuate with market valuations, Chinese stock 
exchanges (including Hong Kong) have by now surpassed their European counterparts in terms of market 
capitalization. The depth of the US equity market coupled with the comparatively low returns in fixed 
income assets helps explain why some of the world’s largest sovereign wealth funds have pivoted to US 
equity markets. 
 Interestingly, the relative market capitalizations of US and Eurozone stock exchanges are of strikingly 
similar magnitudes to the relative role of the dollar and the euro on other dimensions (see Figures III to 
VI and Table I). World demand for US equities may indeed be an important source for US dollar demand. 
The inclusion of equities in this discussion may appear disconnected from the safe-asset discussion that 
initiated this section, but US equities may be in fact safer than locally available fixed-income assets in 
many developing countries, certainly when one considers taxation and the risk of outright expropriation. 
 Importantly, Eurozone capital markets remain much less integrated than in the United States, with 
regulatory and informational barriers leading to a much larger home bias than across US States. The 
illiquidity of markets for many Eurozone governments’ debt is partly due to the significant home bias that 
has arisen after the Eurozone crisis, but the problem extends to capital markets more broadly. Cimadomo, 
et al (2018) survey the literature and find that income shocks across US states appear to be shared to a 
much greater extent than across Eurozone countries. Although one might expect the difference to have 
become less after the formation of the euro, the results in the literature even on that score are mixed. One 
possible reason is the growing importance of private equity, particularly in the United States. In Europe, 
venture capital remains extremely balkanized due in part to regulatory barriers, greatly limiting its impact 
in general, and certainly in sharing risk. (See Raposo and Lehmann 2019 for a discussion of barriers to 
venture capital market integration in Europe).  
 In summary, whether considering government bonds, corporate bonds, and equities (not to speak of 
more exotic instruments like securitized products or ETFs), dollar-denominated and US-originated assets 
dominate the international marketplace. Europe is under-producing assets even relative to the size of its 
economy.   
III.B Other Long-Term Structural Impediments to the Euro’s International Role 
   The correlation between stock market capitalization and anchor currency status is no coincidence. 





center, and usually being a dominant military power.35 Europe does not seem likely to fulfill these criteria 
anytime soon. Following its victory in the Napoleonic Wars, London emerged as the dominant global 
financial center, a role it occupied until World War I, even after the US economy surpassed the UK in 
size.36 In the 17th and 18th century, the Netherlands’ role as a major financial center lead to an important 
international role for the Dutch guilder.37 The strong international role of the Spanish escudo in the 16th 
century coincided with Spanish imperial expansion and political and military dominance in Europe. (See 
Schmelzing 2019 for a timeline of the dominant safe assets from the 13th century to today.) 
 Causation, of course, goes both ways. Demand for US stocks and bonds firms-up demand for US 
dollars. And conversely, attractive and liquid US financial markets provide firms worldwide with dollar 
financing. Nearly one-thousand foreign firms are listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ and many others 
borrow in dollar terms on US bond markets. 
 Aside from aggregate asset measures, dollar dominance in transactions the United States huge 
regulatory control of the “rails” of the international financial system which are used to clear global 
transactions. More than 50% of SWIFT messages are for dollar transactions (see Cook and Soramki, 
2015, annual SWIFT updates). At present, all dollar transactions have to go through banks and clearing 
houses that are regulated by the United States authorities, who in turn can rely on a well-established 
regulatory and legal infrastructure. 
 The Eurozone faces many challenges in establishing a global financial center in continental Europe to 
compete with London, New York, and Singapore. Of course, London is the de facto financial center for 
the Eurozone, but it is the UK has not joined the euro, and Brexit is unfolding as we write. Although some 
of London’s back office business may go to Paris and Frankfurt, the reasons why it will be difficult for 
Germany and France to establish a financial center are well known. First, there is the matter of high 
taxation which makes it less desirable to headquarter in those locations. Second, there is a strong case to 
be made that German and especially French legal structures are not as conducive to sophisticated 
financial market development as Anglo-Saxon law, as La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (1998) 
have argued in an influential body of research.  Third, and perhaps most important going forward, the 
                                                     
35 Eichengreen, Mehl, and Chiţu (forthcoming) document empirically the historical importance of security alliances in predicting 
reserve holdings. See also Strange (1971) for a historical account of the geopolitics of Sterling’s decline and the US dollar’s 
emergence. 
36 Ahamed (2009) emphasizes how the UK’s dominance in banking and trade finance continued to reinforce the centrality of the 
pound up until World War I long after the US had vastly surpassed the UK in economic size, with US bankers remaining mainly 
domestically focused until after the First World War when the UK banks’ capacity to raise capital had been sharply diminished. 





future of finance lies in technology (see, for example, Rogoff, 2016). Europe badly trails both the US and 
China in technology research (OECD, 2018), with little prospect of catchup. (The leading European 
artificial intelligence firm DeepMind, is located in London.) 
 Coeuré (2019) lists another obstacle to the rise of the euro is the fact that the Eurozone does not “speak 
with one voice” in international economic affairs.  That is certainly true, but perhaps equally important is 
that Europe is not a leading military power, and is extremely reliant on the United States for its security.  
Although it is possible to be a dominant financial center without being dominant militarily (Schmelzing 
2019 gives the example of Venice in the 14th century which had great financial power with relatively 
limited military power), the intervening centuries have largely favored dominant military powers as best 
able to produce “safe assets,” and to enforce financial contracts.   
 In sum, although individual Eurozone countries enjoy a plethora of admirable governance features, 
there are at present serious obstacles to rise of the euro as an international currency, including lack of a 
continental financial center, Europe’s weak position in technology research and lack of independent 
military strength.  All these features predate the 2010 Eurozone debt crisis, which we turn next. 
III.C The Eurozone Crisis 
 The stagnating international role of the euro is evaluated in a particularly challenging period for the 
euro area. The region was particularly affected by the global financial crisis. Extensive narratives of the 
European debt crisis have been outlined elsewhere (see Blustein 2016 and Mody 2018, for example), 
including the possibility that the currency union itself exacerbated its depth (see Feldstein 2012, for 
example). Here we narrow in on the extent to which the limited role of the euro as an international 
currency was a cause or an effect of the crisis.38 
 Figure IX shows the spreads of ten-year sovereign bonds for four of the European crisis countries over 
the interest rate on ten-year German bunds (shown in solid lines, left-hand axis). The advent of the euro 
dramatically and rapidly compressed these spreads. Most notably, Greek spreads declined by 700 basis 
points from 1997 to 1999. By the time Greece joined the euro in 2001, the Greek government could 
borrow for ten years at the same rate as the German federal government. This suggests that by the time 
the euro was adopted, investors treated the debts of all European sovereigns as nearly perfect substitutes.39 
                                                     
38 Of course the crisis originated in the US and could have affected the US economy as well. The fact that the demand for dollar 
liquidity overseas increased during the crisis (see Figure V) while the Euro’s future came in to question suggests that the euro’s 
weaknesses may have been structural rather than cyclical. 





Even in this period, however, much of the foreign demand for the bonds of Southern European sovereigns 
was confined to Europe itself (particularly European banks).40  
 This insatiable demand for the debt of peripheral European sovereign bonds is also apparent in the 
share of these bonds held by foreigners, shown in dashed lines in Figure IX (right-hand axis). The share 
of debt held by foreign nationals doubled from 1997 to 2008. At the onset of the crisis, the foreign share 
was as high as that in Germany or France. The spike in the sovereign spreads of the crisis countries in 
2010 to 2012 is well known. The figure shows that this was accompanied by a sharp decline in the share 
of marketable debt of these governments held by foreigners.41 We have seen that home bias increased 
elsewhere in Figure VIII. But the magnitude of the drop in foreign holdings was larger and more 
precipitous in the crisis countries. Further, the foreign holdings of crisis country bonds declined in 
absolute terms, not only as a share of their total outstanding debt. 
 The drop in the relative bond prices together with a decline in the shares in foreign portfolios indicates 
a substantial decline in foreign demand. Figure IX suggests that investors ceased treating European 
sovereign bonds as perfect substitutes as early as 2007. Spreads range from 150 to 550 basis points (and 
are rising) at the time of writing, more than a decade later. While spreads have declined, they are showing 
no sign of converging—this despite massive ECB interventions. (The ECB held around 20 percent of all 
Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese debt in 2018.)  
 The crisis may have been exacerbated by the internationalization of the euro, but it also revealed the 
euro’s deficiencies as an international currency. Investor over-optimism about the equivalent quality of all 
Euro-area sovereign debt in the euro’s first decade (or their reliance on an implicit ECB guarantee) gave 
some sovereigns (e.g. Greece and Portugal) an illusion of fiscal space that narrowed as the crisis 
unfolded. Even when south-European sovereigns were at peak demand, much of this demand was within 
Europe rather than broad-based. The crisis brought to the fore the varying quality of European sovereign 
debt. This has highlighted the short supply of euro-based “safe assets” discussed above and may limit the 
euro’s role as an anchor currency for years to come. Of course, to the extent efforts towards significantly 
greater Eurozone fiscal, banking and ultimately political integration bear fruit, the trends of the past two 
decades may reverse. 
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41 Battistini, Pagano, and Simonelli (2014) have documented the increase in home bias in European sovereign debt during the 





IV. A Central Bank Finding Its Footing 
 
We now turn to new analysis and a brief account of the short monetary history of the euro’s first two 
decades. For most of history, anchor currencies (the US dollar, UK pound, Dutch guilder, or Spanish 
peseta) achieved credibility as an anchor by themselves being backed by commodities (silver or gold). 
Since the end of the Bretton Woods system, anchor currencies have instead been backed by the fiscal 
capacity of the issuing governments and the credibility of the central banks managing their supply.  
The ECB’s de jure inflation targeting mandate provides a framework for a potentially credible anchor 
currency. While inflation has been low and stable in the Eurozone (as in most advanced economies), the 
ECB’s de facto monetary framework can still be said to be a work in progress. The ECB’s first twenty 
years can be divided into to two roughly equal phases. We argue that the first decade (under the 
Duisenberg and Trichet presidencies) can be characterised as a “Bundesbank-plus” period, where the 
ECB provided more continuity with, rather than a break from, the Deutschemark-centric European 
Exchange Rate Mechanism (which again we abbreviate as EERM). A regime change occurred in its 
second decade (under the Draghi presidency) as the Bank took increasingly aggressive measures in 
attempt to aide recovery, particularly in the economies of its southern members. Of course, with an 
expanding policy toolkit of numerous asset purchase programs, this “whatever it takes” period may have 
come with new uncertainties about the nature and credibility of the euro anchor.42   
Our analysis is based on estimating Taylor rules for all Eurozone members and for the Eurozone as a 
whole, while assessing the extent to which the ECB has responded to inflation (or unemployment) in 
specific member countries or the zone as a whole. We begin by describing the approach adopted and 
results obtained from estimating an individual Taylor rule for the countries that make up the Eurozone. 
We consider the possibility that the ECB’s policy interest rate implicitly follows a Taylor-type rule with 
respect to the inflation and unemployment of a given country or region n. If 𝑖𝑡
∗ is ECB’s target policy 
interest rate, the rule takes take the following form: 
 
𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑖0 + 𝛽𝑛(𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 − ?̅?) + 𝛾𝑛𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1,                                                                                                        (1)      
                                                     
42 With normal monetary policy constrained by the lower bound on interest rates (until such day as the Eurozone takes the legal 
and regulatory changes necessary to make unconstrained negative interest rate policy fully effective, see Rogoff, 2016), the ECB 
has been limited in its actions to various forms of quasi-fiscal policy that is difficult to assess, particularly as it takes place 






where 𝜋𝑡,𝑛 is year-on-year inflation for country n and ?̅? is the inflation target. As a proxy for the output 
gap 𝑦𝑡,𝑛, we use the difference between average unemployment in country n over 1992-2007 and 
unemployment in month t.43 𝐸𝑡 is the expectations operator. 𝑖0 is the steady state interest rate, typically 
given by the (real) natural rate of interest plus the inflation target. The Taylor principle (ensuring that the 
real, not only nominal, interest rate responds to inflation) is satisfied for country n when 𝛽𝑛 > 1. Given 
the definition of the output gap, countercyclical policy implies 𝛾𝑛 > 1. 
We allow for the possibility of policy inertia, so that the ECB’s actual policy rate 𝑖𝑡 follows 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑛)𝑖𝑡
∗,                                                                                                                                       (2)          
 
where 𝜌𝑛 is the degree of policy inertia.
44 Together, (1) and (2) give the following estimating equation 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑛)(𝛽𝑛𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑛𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛,                                                                 (3)     
 
where the error term 𝜀𝑡,𝑛 gives the ECB’s deviation from country n’s Taylor rule in month t and 𝛼𝑛 =
(1 − 𝜌𝑛)(𝑖0 − 𝛽𝑛?̅?).  
 Following Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000) and a large literature that follows, we estimate (3) using 
GMM. The data are monthly and span from January 1999, when the euro was adopted, to September 2014 
when the ECB set interest rates at zero and the connection to a simple Taylor rule loses meaning (variants 
that incorporate quantitative easing are not explored here).45 We substitute realized inflation and output 
gaps for their expectations in (3) and employ six lags of these variables as instruments (or forecasting 
tools) in the GMM estimation.46  Figure X shows in bars the coefficients on inflation (𝛽𝑛) for all original 
Eurozone members, Greece, and the Eurozone as a whole. The whiskers depict 95 percent confidence 
                                                     
43 We use year on year inflation to smooth out transient fluctuations to inflation at monthly frequency, which the ECB might 
choose to ignore. Estimating the policy rules with annualized month-on-month inflation leads to similar results, but with larger 
standard errors as could be expected when using noisier data. 
44 The n subscripts on the autocorrelation coefficient 𝜌 reflect the fact that the estimated degree of policy persistence may differ 
when estimating a given country’s Taylor rule. 
45 Data source: Eurostat. We use the Main Refinancing Facility Rate as the policy rate as this is the facility that provides the bulk 
of liquidity to the banking system and is more analogous to the Fed Funds rate. Results are similar when considering the deposit 
facility.  
46 We use the average quarterly lagged interest rate in estimating (3), as the interest rate shows little variability at the monthly 





intervals. The contrast between the coefficient estimates for Germany and other members is striking. The 
estimated coefficient on the inflation rate for Germany is above one; Germany is the only Eurozone 
economy for which the estimated Taylor rule satisfies the Taylor principle (although there are three other 
countries for which the 95% confidence intervals include the possibility of stabilizing monetary policy).47  
 The coefficient for the Eurozone as a whole is of also of note. The point estimate is well below one; 
we can reject that the ECB’s coefficient on Eurozone inflation was above one (that is, satisfies the Taylor 
principle) or above that of Germany, within standard confidence intervals. In other words, one cannot 
reject the hypothesis that the ECB’s practice has been to stabilize inflation in Germany, but not for the 
currency area as a whole. On the surface, at least, these estimates indicate that in the first decade and a 
half of its existence, the ECB may have placed a de facto greater emphasis on stabilizing inflation in 
Germany than elsewhere. This result is anticipated in Smant (2002), who concludes that, after an initial 
period of lower than expected interest rates, since mid-2000 the ECB has set the policy interest rate 
consistent with the Bundesbank’s old policy rule.48 49 
 We explore this hypothesis further by estimating a “horse-race” type regression, where we allow the 
ECB to follow a rule that incorporates inflation and unemployment for both Germany and the bloc as a 
whole. In other words, we modify (1) to read 
 
𝑖𝑡
∗ = 𝑖0 + 𝛽𝐷𝐸(𝐸𝑡𝜋𝐷𝐸,𝑡+1 − ?̅?) + 𝛾𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈(𝐸𝑡𝜋𝐸𝑈,𝑡+1 − ?̅?) + 𝛾𝐸𝑈𝐸𝑡𝑦𝐸𝑈,𝑡+1,                       (4)      
 
where superscripts DE and EU represent Germany and the Eurozone, respectively. The resulting 
coefficients on inflation 𝛽𝐷𝐸 and 𝛽𝐸𝑈 are shown in Figure XI. Once we control for German inflation and 
unemployment, the estimated coefficient on Eurozone inflation is negative and not statistically significant 
                                                     
47 Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2011) show (in the context of a New Keynesian Model) that the critical value of 𝛽𝑛 required for 
stabilization is one only when trend inflation is zero. The critical parameter is increasing in trend inflation. Given that average 
inflation was higher in the European periphery than in Germany during this period, our estimates may if anything overstate how 
appropriate ECB policies were for countries of Southern Europe.   
48 The coefficients on the output gap (𝛾𝑛) are shown in Figure A.5 in the appendix. They paint a somewhat different picture, as 
they are positive for all Eurozone members other than Finland and Germany with the interpretation that the ECB does conduct 
countercyclical monetary policy for most Eurozone members. There is less agreement as to the necessity that the central bank 
responds to unemployment, nor on the value that the coefficient on unemployment should take. Given that the ECB’s dominant 
mandate is achieving and maintaining price stability, one cannot rule out that the countercyclical nature of its policy is indeed 
secondary. 
49 The value of 𝜌𝑛 for a number of countries (France, Greece, the Netherlands) approaches one, leading to convergence problems 
when estimating (3). The estimated coefficients for these countries displayed in Figure X impose the estimated autocorrelation 
coefficient from the Eurozone Taylor rule estimation (𝜌𝐸𝑈 = 0.42) in estimating (3). The estimated autocorrelation coefficient in 
the German Taylor rule is very similar (𝜌𝐷𝐸 = 0.44). We show later in Figure A.7 in the appendix that results are very similar 





from zero. In this specification, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the policy rate didn’t respond to 
Euro-wide inflation innovations that were orthogonal to German inflation. The coefficient on German 
inflation also declines in this horse-race regression, but we still cannot reject the hypotheses that the 
Taylor principle was satisfied for Germany or a de facto policy rule that put a higher weight on German 
inflation than on Eurozone inflation.    
 Certainly, the ECB has not officially adopted a Taylor rule when setting the course of its policies.   
The ECB may include additional variables, such as financial conditions, in its policy considerations.  
Further, in using current vintages of inflation and output, we are employing information that was not 
available to policymakers at the time. (We explore real time data and forecasts below.) As such, our 
findings do not imply that the ECB intentionally favored German inflation to euro area-wide inflation. To 
be absolutely clear, our findings relate to the ECB’s implicit, and ex-post, reaction function, and do not 
demonstrate any explicit intent. Instead, we are illustrating that ex-post real interest rates turned out to be 
more stabilizing for Germany than for the euro area as a whole. 
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we estimate the Taylor rule via for all countries in 
the sample using OLS rather than GMM. Figure A.6 in the appendix shows the coefficient on inflation for 
all countries. The OLS estimates are strikingly similar to those estimated via GMM. Second, estimates of 
policy persistence 𝜌𝑛 may be biased if the ECB didn’t follow a Taylor rule with respect to a country n, 
which is likely true for most individual countries in our sample. To address this, we estimated (3) 
imposing the autocorrelation coefficient estimated from the Eurozone’s Taylor rule, i.e. 𝜌𝑛 = 𝜌𝐸𝑈 for all 
𝑛 ≠ 𝐸𝑈. Figure A.7 in the appendix shows results for all countries, with similar results again. 
Coefficients for Germany’ Taylor rule and that of the Eurozone as a whole are shown for a number of 
additional robustness checks in Figure A.8 in the appendix. Panel A of the figure shows estimates of (3) 
using GMM, but with current rather than expected inflation and output gaps. Panel B adds oil prices (as 
an additional forecasting variable) to the instrument list. In panel C, we add an additional control for ECB 
policy shocks. The shocks are taken from Jarocinski and Karadi (forthcoming) who use high frequency 
data on interest rate futures to isolate the new informational content of ECB monetary policy 
announcements about the path of interest rates.50 Purging interest rates from their surprise component 
                                                     
50 Jarocinski and Karadi write: “We have constructed a novel dataset of euro area high-frequency financial-market surprises 
along similar lines as the Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005b) data for the US. This dataset contains 284 ECB policy 
announcements from 1999 to 2016. Most of these announcements happen after the ECB Governing Council monetary policy 
meeting and consist of a press statement ECB at 13:45 followed by an hour-long press conference at 14:30. Analogously to the 





retains the more systematic variation in the ECB policy rate.51 In all specifications, one cannot reject the 
hypothesis that the ECB was following the Taylor principle for Germany, but can reject that is doing so 
for the Eurozone as a whole, within standard confidence intervals. We can also reject that the weight on 
Eurozone inflation was higher than that on German inflation. 
As Orphanides (2001) emphasizes, using ex-post revised data isn’t informative about policy behavior 
or intent. We cautioned above that our results should not be interpreted as reflecting policy bias or policy 
errors, but instead that hindsight suggests that policy was more stabilizing for Germany than for other 
Eurozone members. It is nevertheless interesting to investigate how policy responded to real time 
estimates and forecasts of macroeconomic data. We conduct analysis using real-time data in Appendix II, 
with results shown in Figure A.9 in the appendix. The results are largely inconclusive: In some 
specifications the policy rate does appear to respond actively to the ECB’s forecasts of Eurozone 
inflation. But it is difficult to ascertain whether the ECB responded more to real-time forecasts of German 
inflation or the Eurozone as a whole.52 
A different way to pose the same question is to re-construct what interest rate policy would have 
looked like using a Taylor rule for the Eurozone and for individual Eurozone members, and ask whether 
actual policy followed that path. Taylor’s (1993) original rule, given by: 
 
𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡 + .5𝑦𝑡 + .5(𝜋𝑡 − 2) + 2,                                                                                                                           (5) 
 
where 𝑖𝑡 is the recommended policy rate, 𝑦𝑡 is the output gap, and 𝜋𝑡 is inflation. As in (1), the output gap 
is measured as the difference between average unemployment in the country in question and 
unemployment in month t.  
Figure XII shows the evolution of the hypothetical policy rate associated with a Taylor rule for two 
Eurozone countries taken at a time: first Portugal and France; and then Germany and the Eurozone as a 
                                                     
minutes before and ending 20 minutes after the event. Whenever there is a press conference after a press statement our surprise 
measure is the sum of the responses in the two windows.”  
51 Controlling for monetary policy surprises that are identified through financial market prices may constitute an over-control.  If 
the ECB did in fact put an excess weight on stabilizing German inflation and this came as a surprise to market participants, these 
shocks would contain information about the systemic response of the ECB to German inflation. 
52 Orphanides (2001) suggests that the use of policymakers’ real-time information set “is likely to be of great importance when 
the investigation concentrates on how policymakers react or how they ought to react to current information”. Again, our objective 





whole.53 54 The Taylor rule is once again estimated with ex-post revised data rather than real time 
estimates. Policy rates were far lower than the Taylor rule would have advocated for France, Portugal, 
and most other Euro-area economies, and indeed for the currency union as a whole until 2008.  By 
contrast, from 1999 to the onset of the global financial crisis, the ECB followed Germany’s “Taylor rule” 
with a remarkable degree of precision. This is most clearly demonstrated in late 2002 and early 2003, 
when the German economy faced a mild recession. The ECB lowered the deposit facility rate from 2.25 
to 1 percent over the course of six months. (The MRO rate declined by a similar margin from 3.25 to 2 
percent.) German inflation was indeed sluggish, with year on year inflation of 0.5 percent in May 2003 
well below the ECB’s target. But Eurozone inflation was higher, declining only to 1.8 percent and above 
the Bank’s 2 percent target for most of this period. Greek, Spanish, and Portuguese inflation peaked at 4 
percent, Italian inflation was just below 3 percent, and French inflation just at target.  
As the crisis hit, the ECB became more willing to loosen policy due to conditions in the crisis 
countries, which  in varying degrees included France, Greece, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, and Spain, as documented in Reinhart and Rogoff (2014). As a result, the policy rate followed 
the Eurozone Taylor rule more closely (Figure XII, last panel). By the time interest rates reached zero and 
went negative in 2013-2014, policy had converged to the Eurozone’s estimated Taylor rule and departed 
substantially from Germany’s. 
One can plausibly argue that the break from Bundesbank-plus regime can be dated earlier, as the 
ECB’s balance sheet nearly doubled in 2011 and the Bank created a number of lending facilities, 
particularly targeting the crisis countries. These included the Long Term Financing Operations (LTRO) 
starting in 2011, Outright Monetary Transactions starting in 2012, and Quantitative Easing, starting in 
2014. While the first has provided liquidity to the banking system, the latter two allow for purchases of 
sovereign bonds. In 2017, the LTRO program expanded to allow banks collateralized borrowing in US 
dollars. That the ECB itself is providing liquidity in foreign currency is prima facie evidence of the euro’s 
decline as an anchor currency. 
Table III quantifies the visual impression arising from Figure XII. It shows the mean squared error 
between the ECB’s policy interest rate and the counterfactual Taylor rule of a central bank following (5) 
for a given country n. The first column shows estimates from the original rule (5). The second column 
                                                     
53 We report the results for France and Portugal, as these are representative of the remaining Eurozone countries (with the 
exception of Germany, as discussed). The Taylor rule for all the remaining Eurozone countries are not reported to economize on 
space but are available from the authors. 





adapts the rule to allow interest rate persistence as in (2), with a coefficient 𝜌 = 0.9. In both cases, ECB 
policy was far closer to Germany’s counterfactual rule than that of any other Eurozone economy, 
including the entire Eurozone. 
In summary, the Eurozone’s monetary framework has evolved in two stages. The first can be 
characterised as a Bundesbank-plus era in roughly 1999-2011, in which the ECB provided continuity 
from the EERM and appears to have mimicked the policies that the Bundesbank would have conducted. 
The second period from 2011 to date reflect a “whatever it takes” era of zero and negative interest rates 
and an expanding ECB balance sheet providing financing to banks and less creditworthy sovereigns. 
 It is too soon to predict what the ECB’s next phase will look like, with a transition in the ECB 
presidency in progress. It is hard to imagine a return to a Bundesbank-plus model from the current 
juncture. The more pertinent question is whether the ECB can gain the credibility required to expand its 
international role. The absence of a European-wide safe asset limits the supply of euro-denominated 
reserves. German and Italian bonds are far from perfect substitutes: The Italian economy hasn’t grown for 
15 years, its banking system is teetering on the brink of collapse. With the implicit ECB guarantee to 
banks and sovereigns in southern Europe, the fear remains that the ECB devolves into a Banca d’Italia 
plus. The gap between an idealized optimal currency union and the reality of the Eurozone’s economy 
and institutions is wide.  
 One can argue that eurozone monetary policy in recent years has come to do a much better job in 
patching up the massive holes in EU wide fiscal policy and this has likely helped stabilize the euro’s 
position, even if it has not been nearly enough to help the euro fulfil its promise of challenging the dollar.  
Further progress will likely require, at a minimum, greater national political stability, and more likely 
entail a greater centralization of eurozone fiscal authority, which does not seem likely in the near term. 
Inter-central bank lending among ECB members (Target II balances) has to some extent provided a 
backdoor Eurobond that has helped sustain financial stability.  But this is not a long-term substitute for 
genuine Eurobond backed by a stronger Federal system.55 
  
                                                     
55 The role of Target II has and whether it been debated it past volumes of this journal. For example, Whelan (2017) writes that 
“there is also evidence that portfolio rebalancing by Spanish and Italian banks and investors (which has seen them sell domestic 








The euro is punching below its weight as an anchor currency and on a host of dimensions including trade 
invoicing, asset denomination, and central bank reserve accumulation. While there may well be a natural 
monopoly in anchor choice and currency denomination we suggest that there are a number of structural 
factors that limit the euro’s appeal. At the present conjuncture, only partially a result of the Eurozone debt 
crisis, a central reason is the scarcity of high-quality marketable euro-denominated assets, and the general 
lack of liquidity compared to dollar debt markets. But we have also pointed to other deeper-seated factors.  
The fact the continent does not boast a financial center of the calibre of New York or London can be 
traced to taxation issues and, perhaps even more durably, advantages of the Anglo-Saxon legal system for 
finance that La Port, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (1998) have emphasized. Then there is the matter of    
the EU’s limited geopolitical reach, which is in part due to its military dependence on the United States. 
Last but not least, with the future of finance intimately linked to technology, Europe’s secondary role in 
technology research (behind the United States and China) is also a long-run limitation. 
 Interestingly, over the near term, the relative international role of the euro may be determined far from 
Europe itself, particularly in East Asia. In December 2015, the People’s Bank of China announced that it 
is moving from a US dollar to anchor to a broader basket of currencies.56 It is too early to determine how 
these exchange rate practices will evolve, but the euro’s role may expand substantially by many of the 
metrics explored in this paper if China does indeed put a larger weight on the European currency. The 
share of world GDP anchored to the euro could increase to 23 percent and central bank reserves in euros 
may increase. It is less clear whether the private sector will follow suit in its denomination of trade and 
asset holdings. The shortage of safe euro-denominated assets that we document in this paper will pose a 
challenge to portfolio diversification aims of both private and official actors. 
 The move to greater renminbi flexibility is a double-edged sword for the international role of the euro. 
Chinese authorities are making efforts internationalize the renminbi. Given the size of the Chinese 
economy, a freely floating renminbi could overtake euro as the world’s second anchor currency virtually 
overnight. If other currencies follow suit, or are already latently anchored to the renminbi, this bloc would 
substantially overshadow the euro bloc.   
                                                     
56 This basket is less diverse in practice than in theory. Many of the currencies in the basket (e.g. the Hong Kong dollar and the 






 Closer to home, we have also highlighted the potential role of the ECB in providing clarity on the 
nature of the euro anchor. We suggest that early ECB monetary policy was de facto an extension of the 
Bundesbank’s pre-1999 policies. During the Eurozone crisis the very future of the currency was on the 
brink and the ECB became bolder and resorted to a wide range of policies to bolster the European 
economy. If the Bundesbank-plus regime was “one size fits one”, the Whatever it Takes regime may be 
“one size fits none”. This problem has no easy solution without significant institutional changes.  
Exacerbating these challenges is that Europe has increasingly come to rely on quasi-fiscal financing from 
the ECB through its quantitative easing policies (which in effect may be regarded as second-best 
substitute for a euro-bill) and its direct support for private sector bank lending (which again involves 
cross-national subsidies and directed lending choices that might ordinarily be the province of fiscal 
authorities)  Given the lack of a European-wide fiscal authority, the ECB fulfils its mandate to the best of 
its ability, but its quasi fiscal tools are limited. The future prospects of the euro as an international (and 
even regional) currency depend on how European policymakers and the ECB rise to these challenges in 
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Figure I. Evolution of Anchor Currencies: Dollar and Euro 
Number of countries weighted by their share in world GDP, 1975-2015 
 
Number of countries 1975-2015 
 
Note: The figure shows the share of countries anchored to the US dollar (top, green line) and to the euro (post 1999) and German 
Deutschemark and French Franc (pre 1999) (bottom, blue line). The thin lines exclude the US from the dollar bloc and current 
Eurozone members from the euro bloc. The top panel weighs the anchored countries by their share in world GDP. The bottom 
panel gives an unweighted measure. The vertical lines show the date of euro adoption. Sources: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004), 









































Note: The maps show countries whose currencies were anchored to the euro (top panel) and the US dollar (bottom panel). 
Brightly-shaded countries were anchored in both 1999 and 2016. Dark shades represent countries that were anchored in 2016, but 
not in 1999 (joined the bloc). Pale shades represent countries that were anchored in 1999, but not in 2016 (departed from the 






Figure III. Currency Composition of Central Bank Reserves: Dollar and Euro, 1995-2018 
  
Note: The figure shows the share of allocated central bank reserves denominated in euro (bottom, blue) and dollar (top, green; 
both left-hand axis). The line (right-hand axis) shows total world central bank allocated reserves in billions of US dollars. The 
vertical line shows the date of euro adoption. Prior to euro adoption, “euro” reserves are replaced with reserves denominated in 
Deutschemarks, French francs, Dutch guilder, and ECU, so that the figure slightly understates total Eurozone reserves before 
1999. Source: International Monetary Fund’s Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves and the authors.  
 
Figure IV. Foreign Exchange Turnover: Shares of Major Currencies, 1995-2016 
   
Note: The figure shows the share of foreign exchange transactions in which each of presented currencies was one side of the 
transaction. The euro is replaced by the Deutschemark prior to 1999. On one hand this understates the share of pre-1999 
Eurozone transactions, because it excludes all Eurozone economies other than Germany. On the other hand it overstates this share 
because it counts trans-national intra-Eurozone transactions. Source: Bank for International Settlements Triennial Survey of FX 














































Figure V. Federal Reserve Dollar Liabilities to non-US residents and ECB Euro Liabilities to non-Eurozone Residents 
 
 
Note: The top line shows the total liabilities of the Federal Reserve to non-US residents (Source: Federal Reserve Bank of New York), January 2000 to March 
2019. The dotted line shows the liabilities held by residents of the EU excluding the UK. The bottom line shows the liabilities of the European Central Bank to 
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Figure VI. Borrowing in Euros and Dollars: Developing Country Public Debt 
 
Note: The figure shows the share of developing countries’ external public and publicly guaranteed debt denominated 
in dollars (top, green line) and to the euro (post 1999) and German Deutschemark and French Franc (pre 1999) 
(bottom, blue line) as a share of total foreign currency denominated external debt. Source: World Bank International 
Debt Statstics. 
 
Figure VII. Marketable Debt Outstanding, 2018  
 
Note: The left panel shows the marketable central government outstanding in billions of US dollars in 2018 for 
Eurozone countries and the US. Eurozone economies are divided into Germany, France, other non-crisis countries, 
and the crisis countries. Sources: US Treasury, L’Agence France Trésor, and Finanzagentur GmbH. The right-hand 
panel shows corporate bonds outstanding and total corporate bank lending as a percent of GDP in the Eurozone and 



















































Figure VIII. Foreign Holdings as a Share of Marketable Government Debt, 1999-2018 
 
Note: The figure shows the percent share of marketable government that is held by foreign investors (private and 
official sectors) for the US, Germany and France. Sources: US Treasury, the Bruegel database of sovereign bond 





















Figure IX. Sovereign Spreads and Foreign Holdings as a Share of Marketable Gov. Debt, 1997-2018 
    Italy         Spain 
 
    Portugal        Greece 
 
Note: The figure shows the percent share of marketable government that is held by foreign investors (private and official sectors, dashed lines, right-hand axis) 
and the spread of the 10 year bond of the country in question over Germany’s (left-hand axis). Panels are for (clockwise from top left-hand panel) Italy, Spain, 
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Figure X. Taylor Rule Coefficients for Euro-Area Economies estimated via GMM, 2000-2014: Inflation 
 
Note: The figures give the Taylor rule coefficients for Euro-area economies and the Eurozone deriving from an estimate of the following equation via GMM with 6 monthly lags of 
inflation and unemployment as instruments: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑛)(𝛽𝑛𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑛𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛. The coefficients 𝛽𝑛 are displayed as bars with 95% confidence 



















































































Figure XI. Horse Race between German and Eurozone Taylor Rules, 2000-2014: Inflation Coefficients 
 
Note: The figures give the inflation coefficients for a Taylor rule that combines both German and Eurozone infaltion: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 +
𝜌𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑛)(𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑡𝜋𝐷𝐸,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1 + 𝛽𝐸𝑈𝐸𝑡𝜋𝐸𝑈,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝐸𝑈𝐸𝑡𝑦𝐸𝑈,𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛. Estimates are via GMM with 6 
monthly lags of inflation and unemployment as instruments. The coefficients 𝛽𝐷𝐸 and 𝛽𝐸𝑈 are displayed as bars with 95% 




























Note: the figure shows (in black) the interest rate policy that would result if a central bank followed a 
Taylor rule, using Taylor’s (1993) original coefficients and specification, for the country in question. The 
original rule is given by 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡 + .5𝑦𝑡 + .5(𝜋𝑡 − 2) + 2. This is compared with the ECB’s policy rate, in blue, 
replaced by the Bundesbank’s rate prior to 1999. Sources: Eurostat, International Monetary Fund, OECD, 
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Note: the figure shows (in black) the interest rate policy that would result if a central bank followed a 
Taylor rule, using Taylor’s (1993) original coefficients and specification, for the country in question. The 
original rule is given by 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜋𝑡 + .5𝑦𝑡 + .5(𝜋𝑡 − 2) + 2. This is compared with the ECB’s policy rate, in blue, 
replaced by the Bundesbank’s rate prior to 1999. Sources: Eurostat, International Monetary Fund, OECD, 
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Table I. Markers of an Anchor Currency: Comparing the Dollar and the Euro 
 
 Indicator US/Dollar   Eurozone/Euro 
Share of Countries Anchored 59  29 
    
Share of World GDP Anchored 69  15 
    
Share of World Reserves 64  21 
    
Share of Developing Country External Debt 74  8 
    
Share of Bank Assets in Local Currency 85  71 
    
Share of Bank Liabilities  in Local Currency 76  59 
    
Trade Invoicing Index 69  56 57 
    
Share of World GDP 18  12 
    
Share of World Exports 9  26 58 
 
  
                                                     
57 The euros’s trade invoicing index would be smaller, and the dollar’s higher, if adjusted to exclude intra-Eurozone trade. If all 
intra-Eurozone trade is invoiced in euros, the dollar index would come to roughly 75 and the euro index would decline to below 
50 under this adjustment. 
58 This figure may overstate the gap between US and Eurozone trade, as the latter includes intra-Eurozone trade. A rough 
estimate of the Eurozone’s exports to the rest of the world is still nearly twice the US share. Source: Eurostat balance of 





Table II. Market Capitalization and Volume of Major Stock Exchanges, December 2018 
Exchange 
Market Capitalization   Monthly Trade Volume 
($ Billion US)   ($ Billion US) 
Total US 33,780  2,714 
     NY Stock Exchange 22,923  1,452 
     NASDAQ 10,857  1,262 
    
Total Eurozone 7,329  356 
     Euronext 3,927  174 
     Deutche Borse (Frankfurt) 1,864  140 
     Borsa Italiana (Milan) 610  - 
    other Eurozone 928  42 
    
Total China (incl. HK) 10,143  888 
     Shanghai 3,919  325 
     Hong Kong 3,819  120 
     Shenzhen 2,405  443 
    
Japan 5,296  482 
    
UK (London Stock Exchange) 3,027  166 
 
Note: The table gives the total market capitalization as of December, 2018 and the monthly trade volume during that month in 






Table III. Mean Squared Error between ECB Policy Rate and Counterfactual Taylor Rule. 
 
Country ρ = 0 ρ = 0.9 
Austria 3.71 3.45 
Belgium 6.25 6.03 
Finland 7.14 6.71 
France 3.45 3.55 
Germany 2.30 2.14 
Greece 10.91 11.40 
Ireland 33.58 33.34 
Italy 6.06 6.04 
Luxembourg 3.41 3.07 
Netherlands 5.32 5.60 
Portugal 6.18 6.36 
Spain 19.11 19.03 
Euro 4.02 4.03 
 
Note: The table gives the Mean Squared Error between the ECB’s policy rate and a counterfactual interest rate if a central bank 
had followed a Taylor rule for the country in question from January 1999 to October 2011. Mario Draghi began his tenure as 
ECB President in November 2011. The counterfactual Taylor rule is estimated using the original Taylor (1993) formula, 𝑖𝑡 =
𝜋𝑡 + .5𝑦𝑡 + .5(𝜋𝑡 − 2) + 2. The second column augments this Taylor rule to allow interest rate persistence with an 







Figure A.1. Major Economies’ Shares in World GDP, 1995-2016 
 
Note: The figure shows the GDP shares of major economies in world GDP.  
Figure A.2. Share of World GDP Anchored to the Dollar and Euro, Weighted by Exchange Arrangement 
 
Note: The figure shows the share of world GDP anchored to the dollar (top) and the euro (bottom), where each 
country is weighted by the inverse of its fine exchange rate arrangement in IRR (2019)—a classification that 
includes 15 categories. For example, this gives a weight of one to countries part of a currency area (such as 
Eurozone members), of one half to hard pegs (such as the renminbi peg to the dollar), and 
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Figure A.3. Share of Central Bank Reserves Held in Euros and the Dollar-Euro Exchange Rate 
 
The figure shows the share of allocated central bank reserves denominated in euro (left-hand axis.) The line (right-hand axis) 
shows the dollar-euro exchange rate (spliced with the Deutschemark-dollar exchange rate at 1999).  Source: International 
Monetary Fund’s Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves, Federal Reserve, and the authors. 
Figure A.4. Federal Reserve Swap Lines During the Global Financial Crisis 
 
Note: Adpated from Bahaj and Reis (2019), courtesey of the authors. The figure shows the dollar amount of swaps provided by 


























Figure A.5. Taylor Rule Coefficients for Euro-Area Economies, 2000-2014: Output Gap 
 
Note: The figures give the Taylor rule coefficients for Euro-area economies and the Eurozone deriving from an estimate of the 
following equation via GMM with 6 monthly lags of inflation and unemployment as instruments: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 +
(1 − 𝜌𝑛)(𝛽𝑛𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑛𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛.  
Figure A.6. Taylor Rule Coefficients for Euro-Area Economies estimated via OLS, 2000-2014: Inflation 
 
Note: The figures give the Taylor rule coefficients for Euro-area economies and the Eurozone deriving from an estimate of the 
following equation via OLS: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝛽𝑛𝜋𝑛 + 𝛾𝑛𝑦𝑛 + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛. The coefficients 𝛽𝑛 are displayed as bars with 95% confidence 
intervals given with whiskers. The hyphothesis 𝛽𝑛 > 1 can be rejected for all countries in the sample except for Gemany and 



































































































































































Figure A.7. Taylor Rule Coefficients for Euro-Area Economies estimated via GMM, 2000-2014: Inflation 
 
Note: The figures give the Taylor rule coefficients for Euro-area economies and the Eurozone deriving from an estimate of the following equation via GMM with 6 monthly lags of 
inflation and unemployment as instruments: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌)(𝛽𝑛𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑛𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛, with 𝜌=0.42 for all countries. The coefficients 𝛽𝑛 are displayed as bars 
with 95% confidence intervals given with whiskers. The hyphothesis 𝛽𝑛 > 1 can be rejected for all countries in the sample except for Gemany and Italy with 95% confidence.  The 




















































































Figure A.8. Roubstness of Taylor Rule Coefficients for Euro-Area Economies estimated via GMM, 2000-2014: Inflation 
 
Note: The figure gives the Taylor rule coefficients for Euro-area economies and the Eurozone deriving from an estimate of the following equation via GMM with 6 monthly lags of 
inflation and unemployment as instruments: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑛)(𝛽𝑛𝐸𝑡𝜋𝑛,𝑡+1 + 𝛾𝑛𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛,𝑡+1) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛. The coefficients 𝛽𝑛 are displayed as bars with 95% confidence 
intervals given with whiskers. Panel A replaces expected inflation and unemployment with  their current values. Panel B includes current oil prices as an additional instrument. 






























































Figure A.9. Horse Race between German and Eurozone Taylor Rules, 2000-2014: Using Real-Time Forecasts 
 
Note: The figures give the inflation coefficients for Taylor rules that combine both German and Eurozone infaltion: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑛 + 𝜌𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌𝑛)(𝛽𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑡𝜋𝐷𝐸,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐷𝐸𝐸𝑡𝑦𝑛, +
𝛽𝐸𝑈𝐸𝑡𝜋𝐸𝑈,𝑡 + 𝛾𝐸𝑈𝐸𝑡𝑦𝐸𝑈,𝑡) + 𝜀𝑡,𝑛. In these regressions, inflation and the output gap are given from real time forecasts, where the output gap replaced by forecasts of GP growth. 
Estimates are via OLS. The coefficients 𝛽𝐷𝐸 and 𝛽𝐸𝑈 are displayed as bars with 95% confidence intervals given with whiskers. Panels A and B are in quarterly frequency and 
Panel C in biannual frequency. Panel A uses real time forecasts of current-year variables, so that t variables represent forecasts at quarter t of current GDP growth. Panels B and C 
use one year ahead forecasts based on the quarter (or half year) t. In Panels A and B, euro area forecasts are from the ECB and German forecasts from Consensus Economics. Panel 























































Note: the figure shows (in black) the interest rate policy that would result if a central bank followed a Taylor rule, using Taylor’s 
(1993) original coefficients and specification, allowing for policy persistence with a coefficient of 𝜌 = 0.9 for the country in 
question. This gives a policy rule: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌)(𝜋𝑡 + .5𝑦𝑡 + .5(𝜋𝑡 − 2) + 2). This is compared with the ECB’s policy 
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Note: the figure shows (in black) the interest rate policy that would result if a central bank followed a Taylor rule, using Taylor’s 
(1993) original coefficients and specification, allowing for policy persistence with a coefficient of 𝜌 = 0.9 for the country in 
question. This gives a policy rule: 𝑖𝑡 = 𝜌𝑖𝑡−1 + (1 − 𝜌)(𝜋𝑡 + .5𝑦𝑡 + .5(𝜋𝑡 − 2) + 2). This is compared with the ECB’s policy 
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Appendix I: The Classification Algorithm 
This appendix gives a brief and rough exposition of the algorithm used to classify the exchange 
arrangements and anchor currencies of the 194 countries and territories that comprise our sample. Full 
details can be found in IRR (2019). A flowchart summarizing the algorithm is found in Figure A.11 in the 
appendix. We first assess whether the currency in question has a parallel market. If so, we use the market 
rather than the official rate for purpose of our analysis. Countries with a parallel market where no market 
data was available are classified as having no anchor currency for the purpose of this paper.  
For each of the 194 countries and territories studied, the raw data include the month-on-month rate of 
inflation and the absolute value of the monthly change in the (average) spot exchange rate. We denote the 
latter as εa,n,t for country n in month t, with respect to anchor currency a. The exchange rate is evaluated 
against eleven candidate anchor currencies.59 The candidate anchors were chosen based on historical 
practice and currencies that are widely included in exchange rate baskets. In addition, currencies that are 
classified as freely floating themselves become candidate anchors in the relevant years.60 In the current 
classification, the Chinese renminbi is not considered a candidate anchor as it has been strongly linked to 
the dollar itself and is not convertible. We allow for de facto currency baskets as potential anchors. 
Baskets include a dollar-euro, dollar-yen, euro-yen, and dollar-euro-yen basket, with equal weights on the 
anchors in each basket. In practice, no currencies were anchored to the latter two baskets. Countries with 
a dollar-euro anchor are split evenly between the two anchors in the analysis.  
The remainder of the algorithm is outlined in Figure A.6. The first step is to separate currencies that 
were freely falling among those with floating exchange rates. A currency is deemed “freely falling” if the 
country experienced a year on year inflation rate exceeding 40% for 12 months or experienced a currency 
crash. A currency crash is defined by a 25 percent month on month deprecation if the rate of depreciation 
was more than 10 percentage points greater than in the previous month. The regime is classified as freely 
falling in the six-month window following a currency crash. This dimension of our algorithm separates 
the cases where the exchange rate undergoes large fluctuations due to a lack of monetary control from 
currencies that fluctuate freely in tranquil times. Freely falling currencies are classified as having no 
anchor or reference currency. 
                                                     
59 The candidate anchors are the US dollar, the Deutschmark, and French franc (replaced by the euro following 1999), the 
Japanese yen, the British pound, the Russian ruble, the Swiss franc, the Australian dollar, the South African rand, and the 
Brazilian real. 





The remaining countries are classified based on exchange rate bands that were determined based on 
historical practice (see IRR, 2019 for more detail on the choice of band widths and frequencies): 1%, 2%, 
and 5%. Each stage of the algorithm assesses whether the frequency at which the currency in question 
remained within the given band, i.e. 𝑃(𝜀𝑎,𝑛,𝑡 < 𝑏)  for some band b, within a 5-year rolling window. If 
the currency is within a 1% band for at least 80% of observations (𝑃(𝜀𝑎,𝑛,𝑡 < 1%) > 80%), the currency 
is classified as having a hard peg to anchor a and is assigned a as its anchor currency.  
If the currency is within a 2% band for at least 80% of observations (𝑃(𝜀𝑎,𝑛,𝑡 < 1%) > 80%), for any 
anchor a, the currency is classified as having a narrow band. If the currency is within a narrow band of 
more than one anchor, the anchor currency is determined by the anchor with respect to which the 
exchange rate remained within a 1% band at highest frequency. That is, the anchor is classified based on 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑎{𝑃(𝜀𝑎,𝑛,𝑡 < 1%)} .  
Similarly, if the currency is within a 5% band for 100% of observations 𝑃(𝜀𝑎,𝑛,𝑡 < 5%) = 100%, for 
any anchor a, the currency is classified as having a wide band. If the currency is within a wide band of 
more than one anchor, the anchor currency is determined by the anchor with respect to which the 
exchange rate remained within a 2% band at highest frequency. That is, the anchor is classified based on 
𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑎{𝑃(𝜀𝑎,𝑛,𝑡 < 2%)} .  
Currencies that were not within any of the aforementioned bands are classified as floating. 
Among these, countries whose central banks intervened with the explicit intention of affecting the level or 
variability of the exchange rate are classified as “managed floating”, with the remaining countries 
classified as “freely floating”. Freely floating currencies do not have an anchor and are themselves 
candidate anchor currencies. For managed floating currencies, we use the term “reference currency” 
rather than “anchor currency” to differentiate their looser association with the international currency in 
question. We use four separate criteria to assign a reference currency to these countries. First, in which 
currency is the majority of foreign trade invoiced? Second, in which currency is the largest share of 
external (public and publically guaranteed) debt denominated? Third, which currency comprises the 
largest share of central bank foreign reserves? And finally, which was the most recent anchor currency? 
Conveniently, all four indicators point to the same reference currency in almost all countries with a 
managed floating regime allowing an unambiguous classification of reference currency. For more details 






Appendix II: Taylor Rules with Real Time Data 
As Orphanides (2001) emphasizes, using ex-post revised data isn’t informative about policy behavior 
or intent. Our analysis in the main text therefore should be interpreted as reflecting the policy response to 
ex-post realized macroeconomic conditions, rather than real time policy intentions, biases or errors. It is 
nevertheless interesting to investigate how policy responded to real time estimates and forecasts of 
macroeconomic data. 
The ECB publishes its real time quarterly estimates and forecasts of inflation and GDP growth for the 
euro area.61 These are biannual forecasts by ECB staff staggered with member national bank forecasts, 
giving forecasts in each quarter that likely reflect the information set of the ECB board in real time. 
Unfortunately, the ECB doesn’t publish its forecasts for individual member countries so we are unable to 
assess the extent to which the ECB was responding to its forecasts of specific countries, including 
Germany. Instead, we use real time private sector forecasts (collected by Consensus Economics) on 
inflation and GDP growth in Germany. Unfortunately, these forecasts are collected only twice a year. We 
run regressions at a quarterly frequency and assume that forecasts for Germany persist at the previous 
quarter’s value in quarters with no data. 
Figure A.11 in the appendix compares the coefficient on euro area inflation and German inflation in a 
regression as in (4). Absent unemployment forecasts, the variable y is given by GDP growth (forecasts). 
Estimating potential output goes beyond the scope of this paper, but GDP growth is a proxy for the output 
gap if potential output grows at a constant rate. The equation is estimated via least squares, as advocated 
by Orphanides (2001).  
Panel A of Figure A.11 in the appendix shows that interest rates respond negatively to both Eurozone 
and German inflation, based on real-time inflation vintages, albeit with very large standard errors. This is 
consistent with Orphanides’ (2001) findings regarding the Federal Reserve. As he suggests, this may 
reflect forward-looking policy. Accordingly, Panel B re-estimates the policy rule, using one-year ahead 
forecasts of inflation and GDP growth.62  Here, the coefficient on Eurozone inflation is greater than one 
and statistically significant from zero at the 10 percent level. 63 In contrast, the coefficient on German 
                                                     
61 https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/strategy/ecana/html/table.en.html 
62 The data give forecasts by calendar year. Year-ahead forecasts are obtained by a weighted average of current and next-year’s 
forecast, appropriately weighted based on the current quarter. 
63 A Taylor rule for the Eurozone without controlling for German macroeconomic variables yields a smaller coefficient on one-





inflation is negative. This is one specification that suggests that the ECB may have attempted to follow a 
rule that targets expected Eurozone inflation based on its real-time information set.64 
The results in Panel B are biased against finding a policy response to German inflation, because the 
Eurozone forecasts are from the ECB itself and at higher frequency. Panel C of Figure A.11 in the 
appendix level the playing field by estimating (4) in biannual regression using private sector inflation and 
GDP forecasts from Consensus economics for both the euro area and Germany. The figure shows a strong 
reaction to German inflation forecasts, with a coefficient of nearly 2, and a negative response to euro area 
inflation forecasts, although standard errors are very large in both cases. This suggests that the results in 
Panel B need to be taken with a grain of salt, as they may be driven by the different sources of inflation 
expectation data.65 
While there is some suggestion in the data that the ECB may have targeted Eurozone inflation, 
the picture arising from Figure A.11 is largely inconclusive. 
                                                     
64 ECB forecasts are uncorrelated (correlation coefficient -0.18) with realized inflation based on ex-post data. The correlation of 
German Consensus inflation forecasts with realized inflation is slightly positive at 0.3, while the same figure for euro area 
Consensus forecasts is -0.25. 
65 The correlation between the ECB’s and Consensus Economics’ forecasts is 0.95, so that the difference between panels A and B 
is mainly due to the different forecast frequency rather than divergence between private and official forecasts. 
